
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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

7 MAY 1976

Honorable George H. Bush Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear George:

This is in response to your letter of 28 April in which you took exception to the proposed Yarmolinsky study. I understand your concern and have taken appropriate action to confine the terms of the study to Department of Defense matters.

As the study progresses, I would enjoy consulting with you from time to time especially if the study reveals items of mutual interest. In any event, I will routinely update you since I realize that this is a problem of concern to all of us.

Sincerely,

Robert Ellsworth

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
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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301



21 APR 1976

Honorable George Bush Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D. C. 20501

Dear George:

A broad study of unauthorized disclosure of government secrets is going to be undertaken at my initiative. The study effort will be chaired by Adam Yarmolinsky. A panel of people outside of government will be constituted and focused on the problem. I am especially interested that the study give us some improved insight into the nature and sources of this problem. The terms of reference agreed with him are attached.

When the panel has been formed and the list of its other members is completed I will send it to you. Adam will want to talk to you in more detail about the objectives of the study and how it should proceed. You may want to follow the study as it proceeds since the problems being studied are, of course, of general concern.

Warm regards.

 \mathcal{L}

Sincerely

ADAM YARMOLINSKY.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Unauthorized disclosure of government secrets appears to have increased significantly in the past decade. While some of this disclosure has been a reaction, direct or indirect, to official misconduct, and to misuse of secrecy, it has obscured general recognition of the public interest in keeping legitimate government secrets, and it has made the protection of those secrets substantially more difficult. The study group will address itself to the problem of securing better protection for those secrets, including not only intelligence data and methods, but military and diplomatic secrets as well.

The study group will examine the motivations for disclosure, and the conditions that make disclosure more (or less) probable; the impact of mistrust and alienation in popular attitudes toward government; the feasibility of better methods of selecting and training persons handling classified material; the effects of overclassification and delayed declassification; the tradeoffs between wider dissemination and better protection of secrets both within and outside the government; and the possibilities for reducing unnecessary dissemination of secrets within government.

The study group will recommend policies and procedures to deal with these problems.

Attempts by foreign powers or their agents to obtain government secrets are not within these terms of reference.

Ser-6

28 April 1976

The Honorable Robert F. Ellsworth Deputy Secretary of Defense Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Bob.

I have problems with the letter you sent me on 21 April. It seems to me that the whole question of unauthorized disclosure of government secrets and declassification really is the responsibility of the DCI under the Executive Order. If Mr. Yarmolinsky's study was to be restricted to Department of Defense matters, then I would not picture this as my area of concern.

Ed Proctor is already chairing a group of Intelligence Community officials who are developing principles and guidelines for classification and control of intelligence. Other efforts in this area are being undertaken by my NFIB Security Committee and the NSC.

I feel any Community-wide study panels of this nature should be appointed by the DCI.

Let's discuss this.

Sincerely,

George Bush Director

DCI/kgt/28 April 1976 Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

J - D/DCI/IC

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DCI/IC 76-004

27 April 1976

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SECOM-D-147 26 April 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence

Community

25X1 **FROM**

Chairman, Security Committee

SUBJECT

: Proposed DoD Study of Unauthorized Disclosure of Government Secrets

REFERENCE

: Letter to the DCI from Mr. Ellsworth, Dated 21 April 1976

1. The broad Government-wide study proposed by "Mr. Ellsworth would usurp some of the DCI's authority. The National Security Act of 1947 states:

"The DCI shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

Executive Order 11905 states:

"The DCI will ensure that appropriate programs are developed which properly protect intelligence sources, methods and analytical procedures."

2. At the present time Dr. Edward Prottor, DDI, is chairing a group of senior officials in the Intelligence Community, the purpose of which is to develop principles and guidelines for the classification and control of intelligence. The goal of his group is to protect those aspects of intelligence sources and methods that truly deserve protection and to allow broader access to intelligence by applying the lowest appropriate classification and minimum dissemination controls. This includes declassification and release to the public.

ILLEGIB

Unclassified when removed from Attachment.

Approved For Release 2009/01/02 : CIA-RDP94B00280R001200110003-1

- 3. The Intelligence Community has been greatly frustrated by unauthorized disclosures of classified information for many years. A working group of the Security Committee completed a study on unauthorized disclosures of sensitive intelligence sources and methods. In its report dated 16 December 1975 (attached), nine recommendations were made. The Security Committee has not reached a final agreement on these recommendations.
- 4. The current DoD proposal appears to go beyond protection of sources and methods. Mr. Elisworth indicates Yarmolinsky's group will cover not only intelligence data and methods, but military and diplomatic secrets as well. Such a broad-sweeping study by people outside of government of protection of government secrets should more appropriately be ordered by the National Security Council rather than by a department of the Executive Branch.
- 5. Such a study by people outside of government might prove valuable at this time. Numerous studies by the Intelligence Community have not led to a solution of this frustrating problem. Recommendation by an unbiased public group might find support in both the public sector and government circles.

RECOMMENDATION:

The DoD proposal goes beyond the DCI's responsibilities for protecting intelligence sources and methods. The establishment of such a non-government group to make a study encompassing "all government secrets" should more appropriately be tasked by the NSC. Cooperation by the government agencies concerned would be greater if such a study were undertaken at the request of the NSC rather than DoD.

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Chairman, Security Committee

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